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Discussion of the democratic strengths or, more usually, weaknesses of the EU tends to focus 
on the degree of democracy that is available or possible at the EU level. Such thinking reflects 
a certain neo-functionalist logic that has governed much scholarly writing about the 
relationship between EU integration and democracy. It assumes that enhanced competences 
for EU institutions potentially create a democratic deficit at the European level that can only 
be filled by enhancing to an equal degree the democratic features of those same bodies, most 
especially by increasing the powers of the European Parliament (EP) (Rittberger 2005; 2014). 
The articles in this special issue take a different tack that challenges that assumption. They 
focus on what has been called the democratic disconnect between the domestic democratic 
institutions of the member states and the EU (Lindseth 2010: 234), rather than a democratic 
deficit in the operation of EU institutions. Consequently, the contributors look at how EU 
policy-making might be authorized by, and rendered more responsive and accountable to, the 
citizens of the member states through EU affairs and policy-making figuring more 
prominently in their domestic democratic processes, with National Parliaments (NPs) playing 
a key role as mechanisms of democratic reconnection.  
The circumstances creating both the need and the possibility for such a democratic 
reconnection have arisen with the growing politicization of EU affairs at the domestic level 
that has come with the Euro crisis. Politicisation in this context involves greater issue 
salience, actor expansion, and polarization (Hutter and Grande 2014), stemming from the 
increased political authority of the EU, the rising prominence of and voter interest in the 
issues it tackles as a result of its enhanced competences (de Wilde and Zürn 2012), and the 
ways it appears to undermine or constrain domestic democratic decision-making (Schmidt 
2006). The degree and nature of politicization depends on the existence of a favourable 
political opportunity structure, defined as national narratives, media receptiveness, 
competitive party politics, referendums and crises. Such politicization has been categorised 
along three dimensions (see Hurrelmann 2012). First, it may occur in different discursive 
arenas (parliaments, parties, civil society, media, citizens). Second, it may address different 
aspects of European integration (constitutional issues, identities, concrete policies). Third, it 
relates to different kinds of political cleavages (national structures of conflict and 
transnational structures of conflict). However, while some scholars have assumed that such 
politicisation offers an opportunity to develop democracy at the EU level, most particularly 
through the development of European political parties and the strengthening of the EU (de 
Wilde and Zürn 2012), our focus lies in exploring its potential for fostering democracy with 
regard to the EU at the member state level. 
We will here define politicization as follows: a European issue is politicized to the 
extent it is raised as a relevant object of – or factor in – political contestation within the main 
arenas of collective decision-making of a domestic political system. In other words, 
politicization denotes the saliency of and polarization around a European issue in domestic 
political discourse.  There can be no doubting that politicization in this sense has occurred to 
an ever greater degree in recent years (Hutter and Grande 2014; Kriesi and Grande 2012; 
Miklin 2014; De Wilde and Zürn 2012) though some commentators remain cautious as to the 
degree to which domestic public spheres have been politicized (Hurrelmann, Gora and 
Wagner 2014; Miklin 2014). Crisis-related decisions, like those to provide financial support 
to Greece, or measures like the European stability mechanism or the Fiscal Compact, have 
caused wide debate and media attention, and resulted in public protest in many member states. 
Eurobarometer data from autumn 2012 reveals that awareness of EU institutions has reached 
an all-time high (91% of respondents having heard of the EP, 85% of the Commission and 
ECB, 71% of the Council) (Standard Eurobarometer 78, Public Opinion in the EU – Autumn 
2012). 
Such politicization at the domestic level can involve either hostility to the integration 
process, as in the case of the rise of populist Eurosceptic movements, or the assimilation of 
EU affairs into mainstream political debate by the main government and opposition parties. 
To adapt Hurrelmann’s (2012) categorization, the first kind of politicization relates to 
constitutional and identity issues and involves a cleavage between pro- and anti- EU, whereas 
the second concerns predominantly concrete policies and involves a cleavage between left and 
right that entails a debate about which kind of EU to have rather than whether the EU should 
exist at all. Many commentators have regarded the domestic politicization of the EU as 
naturally tending towards the former, Eurosceptic, rather than the latter, left-right, variety 
(Bartolini 2005; Mudde 2013). For example, Hooghe and Marks (2009) characterise 
politicization of the EU as operating primarily along a ‘GAL-TAN’ dimension, with 
green/alternative/libertarian parties arguing for, and traditional/authoritarian/nationalist parties 
arguing against further (or even any) integration. From this perspective, the politicization of 
EU affairs becomes associated with waning support for the EU and raises fears of a backlash 
and increasing gridlock in EU decision-making, as member state governments increasingly 
insist on protecting narrowly defined national interests to appease growing Eurosceptic 
demands. Yet, arguably such attitudes derive from the failure of the main parties to politicize 
EU issues themselves. As Hooghe and Marks (2009) also note, 19 of the most mainstream 
European political parties are more Euro-supportive than their voters, and often internally 
divided among their members over the issue, with the result that they have attempted to 
depoliticize the issue. However, it might be that this failed strategy was misguided, and that if 
they became mechanisms of politicization of EU affairs instead, then they could strengthen 
European democracy and contribute to weakening the lack of congruence in the EU system of 
multilevel governance between where decisions are made (in Brussels) and where politics 
plays itself out (in the national capitals) (Schmidt 2006). However, to achieve such a 
democratic reconnection, the nature of politicization needs to be moved from simply debating 
the legitimacy of more or less (or any) EU integration and turn instead to the discussion of the 
desirability of different kinds of European policies. This shift will only occur if mainstream 
parties take the initiative and employ politicisation in ways that undercut Eurosceptic claims 
that the EU undermines member state democratic processes and identities.  
 In this special issue we explore the extent to which NPs and political parties can foster 
this form of politicization. With the Lisbon Treaty, NPs have acquired new powers that 
potentially make this process possible (Article 12 TEU). They now have the ability to ensure 
EU measures respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 TEU). They 
are also better informed, having draft legislative proposals forwarded to them directly. In 
addition, inter-parliamentary fora have developed that allow them to act directly at the EU 
level in key areas involving executive discretion, notably fiscal matters and foreign and 
security policy. The articles in this issue explore different facets of these powers as employed 
by NPs and political parties. In each case, the authors explore how far they have facilitated the 
domestic politicization of EU affairs by the main national political parties. 
 
 The text by Sandra Kröger and Richard Bellamy sets the scene by exploring the 
normative and empirical basis for NPs to act as mechanisms for what they term the 
domestication and the normalization of EU affairs. Domestication involves both the ‘taming’ 
of the EU, so that it respects the integrity of the domestic democratic sphere, through such 
measures as the policing of subsidiarity, and the ‘bringing home’ of EU affairs by facilitating 
its domestic debate. Normalization involves the framing of the debate in ideological terms, 
such as left-right, with regard to concrete policies. The argument is that taming the EU 
potentially allows it to be brought home and debated in normalized terms. Other contributions 
pick up this theme. Katrin Auel, Olga Eisele and Lucy Kinski explore how far the electoral 
contestation of EU issues as a result of the Euro crisis has created an incentive structure that 
promotes communication of EU affairs by parties. Their data, collected in seven EU 
parliaments from 2010 to 2013, shows that greater political contestation in public opinion has 
a positive impact on the communication of EU affairs. However, it also reveals that the 
impact of political contestation within parliament is ambivalent in that the ‘presence and 
strength of Eurosceptic parties is a positive, but surprisingly not a decisive, factor for 
parliamentary communication, while disagreement between the governing parties decreases 
the overall number of communication activities’. By contrast, the article by Tapio Raunio 
looks at the ways the representation of the Eurosceptic True Finns in the Finnish parliament 
has potentially undermined established norms of appropriateness of how to deal with EU 
affairs in the Eduskunta. Given NPs are most effective at debating and influencing policy to 
the extent at least a majority of their members share a broad agreement on the legitimacy and 
even obligation of their deliberating given issues, domestic politicization based on a pro-anti 
EU cleavage may undermine the capacity for the parliamentary domestication and 
normalization of EU affairs. However, the contribution by Arndt Wonka and Sascha Göbel 
reveals how in more propitious conditions parliaments may be able to achieve both these 
effects. Germany benefits from a low level of Euroscepticism and the advantage of being the 
dominant player in the EU, a position much strengthened by the Euro crisis, even if that status 
brings considerable obligations as well as advantages. In addition, the NP, the Bundestag, is a 
strong parliament, the position of which in EU matters has been considerably strengthened by 
the Federal Constitutional Court. As a result, the authors find that considerable left-right 
contestation could occur over the fiscal measures adopted during the Fiscal Crisis without 
calling into question Germany’s support for the EU.  
 
The last two contributions explore the inter-parliamentary role of NPs. The text by 
Carina Sprungk notes that NPs today seem to be ascribed mainly coordinative roles in the EU, 
and that their de facto cooperation may work against the politicization of EU affairs as 
defined above. According to Sprungk, that is because the object of their contestation is the EU 
itself, as well as the behaviour of the domestic government, rather than substantive issues, 
thereby preventing a more partisan debate of EU affairs. Finally, the contribution by Ian 
Cooper, which addresses the recently created inter-parliamentary conference to discuss and 
oversee the EU’s regime of economic governance (Article 13 of the Fiscal Treaty), confirms 
two main aspects of NPs’ involvement in EU affairs. First, it shows that NPs have started to 
exert a collective role in the oversight of EU legislation, thereby seeking to assert a stronger 
role overall. And second, it shows that NPs  still seem not to debate EU affairs mainly in 
terms of left-right or associated ideological cleavages, confirming the argument made by 
Sprungk as well as by Kröger and Bellamy. Instead, the debates so far have focused on the 
‘nature and purpose of the conference itself’, reflecting ‘competing visions for the 
parliamentary oversight of the EU’ between the EP and NPs. Nevertheless, the attempt by the 
latter to strengthen their role through such inter-parliamentary bodies testifies to a concerted 
wish on the part of NPs to domesticate and tame the EU and to thereby address the democratic 
disconnect. 
 
Therefore, the evidence is mixed as to how far NPs can redirect the politicization of 
the EU in ways that will promote democratic reconnection and thereby subvert Eurosceptic 
opposition to regional integration. Much depends on contingent factors, such as the strength 
and weakness of the member states, the role of the NPs in the political system, the tradition of 
populist opposition to the EU and party politics more generally, and the ways these interact. It 
may also be that inter-parliamentary cooperation serves to Europeanize parliaments in ways 
that subvert their domestic role as forums for contestation, control and communication of 
executive action. Yet, it is also true that NPs are reasserting their rights and in the process 
changing the character of EU decision-making in ways that reflect the reassertion of the need 
to reflect, respond and reconnect to the ever more politicised democratic will of the 
electorates of the member states. 
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